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CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY 
DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the city of Utrecht celebrated the 3001h anniversary of the Treaty of Utrecht. 
The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht was the first in a series of treaties concluded by the major 
European powers and brought the War of the Spanish Succession to an end and 
therefore stability in Europe. Inspired by this treaty, the Treaty of Utrecht 
Foundation and Utrecht University formulated three key principles which reflect 
the necessary conditions for long-term peace (the Utrecht Principles). The Utrecht 
Principles are: 
- 'respect for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity; 
- harnessing the power of art and multiculturalism to create a sustainable society; 
- the exchange of knowledge to promote social cohesion and renewal.'1 
One of the dangers to sustainable societies and long-term peace is climate change. 
Indeed, the States Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)2 have acknowledged 'that change in the Earth's climate and its 
adverse effects are a common concern of mankind' (preambular paragraph 1) and 
have expressed determination 'to protect the climate system for present and future 
generations' (preambular paragraph 23). 3 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), opened for signature on 
4 June 1992, entered into force on 21 March 1994, UNTS Vol. 1771, No. 30822. 
The term 'climate system' was defined in Article 1(3) UNFCCC as 'the totality of the atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interactions'. This determination in the UNFCCC's 
preamble resembles the International Court of Justice's recognition in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that 'the environment is not an abstraction but 
represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including 
generations unborn'. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), 
para. 29. 
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Recently, Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)4 concluded that there is a clear human influence on the climate system. 5 The 
Working Group reported that climate change has resulted, among other things, in the 
melting of the Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets and a rise in the sea level and will cause 
changes in the global weather cycle.6 These consequences may result in 'dramatic 
ecological, social and economic changes, which threaten human security and have the 
potential to threaten both international peace and security and the stability, and 
possibly the very existence, of nation states'? 
While the threats of the consequences of climate change to human security 
already appear to be significant, these threats will likely be aggravated if the 
consequences of climate change cause a breakdown of international peace and 
security. Indeed, a breakdown of international peace and security in itself already 
poses a severe threat to human security, especially if such breakdown results in armed 
conflict. 
While the relationship between (the consequences of) climate change and human 
security have been discussed elsewhere, this article focuses on the relationship 
between climate change and human security in times of armed conflict. After all, the 
effects of climate change are likely to increase the vulnerability of those caught up in 
armed conflict.8 This article thus seeks to clarify the rules of public international law 
which would appear to be most relevant for the protection of the victims of armed 
conflict under such circumstances. These rules follow not only from international 
humanitarian law, which is primarily applicable in times of armed conflict (section C), 
but also from international human rights law (section D). 
Before discussing these rules in more detail, however, this article first considers 
the relationship between climate change and armed conflict in general and the legal 
framework relevant to seeking to prevent armed conflict (section B). The article ends 
with a brief conclusion. 
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The IPCC was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and was endorsed by the General Assembly in 
Resolution 43/53 of 6 December 1988 (para. 5) on the 'Protection of Global Climate for Present and 
Future Generations of Mankind'. It was awarded theN obel Peace Prize in 2007. 
IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Headline Statements from the Summary 
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IPCC, Climate Change 2013, supra note 5. 
R. Rayfuse and S.V. Scott, Mapping the Impact of Climate Change on International Law, in: R. 
Rayfuse and S.V. Scott, International Law in the Era of Climate Change 3 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012), with reference to the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report. 
K. Hulme, Climate Change and International Humanitarian Law, in: R. Rayfuse and S.V. Scott, 
International Law, supra note 7, pp. 191-193. 
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B. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ARMED CONFLICT 
The link between climate change and armed conflict has been researched extensively 
over recent decades.9 According to some, the debate as to the relationship between 
climate change and armed conflict is complicated due to an alleged lack of data and 
differences in methodology.10 Others, however, conclude that there is a strong causal 
connection between the impact of climate change and human conflict (in the broadest 
sense of the word, thus ranging from individual-level violence to civil war). Therefore, 
'anthropogenic climate change has the potential to substantially increase conflict 
around the world, relative to a world without climate change'.l1 
In 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed deep concern 
about the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change, including the 
rising sea level, and requested the Secretary-General to draft a comprehensive report 
on the topic 'based on the views of the Member States and relevant regional and 
international organizations'.12 The following year the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations submitted his report on 'Climate Change and Its Possible Security 
Implications' (Climate Change Report)P He observed that although 'empirical 
evidence on the relationship between climate change and conflict remains sparse and 
largely anecdotal', and although quantitative studies fail to confirm statistically 
significant links between environmental factors and conflict, that does not mean 
these links do not exist. Rather, environmental factors may exacerbate conflict 
dynamics and risk through multiple and indirect pathways, interacting in complex 
ways with social, political and economic factors, which tend to be more direct and 
proximate drivers of armed conflict.l4 Climate change is thus a 'threat multiplier, 
namely as a factor that can work through several channels (. .. ) to exacerbate existing 
sources of conflict and insecurity'.l5 
Indeed, the above-mentioned consequences of climate change may endanger the 
existence of low-level countries, in particular small island states and delta regions, 
which are often densely populated.16 Further, the melting of the ice sheets will make it 
technically and economically possible to exploit natural resources in the polar regions, 
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See for a short overview of political science studies and econometric literature, C. Gray, Climate 
Change and the Law on the Use of Force, in: R. Rayfuse, S.V. Scott, International Law, supra note 7, 
pp. 219-222. 
J. Scheffran et al., Climate Change and Violent Conflict, 336 Science (2012). 
S. Hsiang et al., Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict, 341 Science 12 (2013). 
A/RES/63/281 of 30 June 2008. 
A/64/350, Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications, Report of the Secretary-General 
of 11 September 2011. 
Climate Change Report, paras 64 and 67. 
Climate Change Report, para. 13. 
Climate Change Report, para. 75. See also preambular paras 12 and 19 of the UNFCCC with 
reference to A/RES/44/206 of22 December 1989. 
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and open shipping routes through the Arctic (the Northeast Passage), thus stimulating 
states to strengthen their territorial claims in the area.17 And the occurrence of extreme 
weather events may increase the risk of conflict between states which rely on shared 
resources, such as trans-boundary water resources.l8 
In view of these potential risks, the Security Council of the United Nations debated 
the impact of climate change on peace and security in 2007 and 2011. After all, 
pursuant to Article 24 of the UN Charter the Security Council's primary responsibility 
is the maintenance (and if necessary the restoration) of international peace and 
security. In 2011, the President of the Security Council released a Presidential 
Statement on behalf of the Council, 19 in which the Council reaffirmed its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and stressed 
the importance of conflict prevention strategies. The President of the Council further 
recognised the responsibility for sustainable development issues, including climate 
change, conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. 20 
Contrary to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, 21 the Security Council did not 
qualify climate change as a threat to international peace and security. As a matter of 
fact, the states which participated in the discussion were even divided on the question 
whether climate change as such was within the jurisdiction of the Security Council in 
the first place. Although the Security Council has the discretion to qualify a situation 
as a threat to international peace and security and although it has indeed taken a wide 
view of this concept (arms proliferation, terrorism, threat to human security), 22 and 
most states have indeed recognised the threats posed by climate change, a number of 
states doubted whether the Security Council was the appropriate forum to discuss 
climate change.23 
17 
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Climate Change Report, para. 76. 
Climate Change Report, para. 74. 
S/PRST/2011/15 of 20 July 2011. 
Subsequently, the Council underlined the General Assembly's reaffirmation of the importance of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and expressed its concern that possible adverse 
effects of climate change may aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security; 
expressed its concern about the security implications of the loss of territory due to sea level rise; and 
generally noted that possible security implications of climate change may be important for the 
Security Council in relation to matters of international peace and security that are under its 
consideration. The Council therefore requested the Secretary-General to ensure that this contextual 
information would be submitted to the Council. 
The Secretary-General referred to the fact that hundreds of millions of people were in danger of 
food and water shortage and that environmental refugees were 'reshaping the human geography' of 
the planet. S/PV.6587, Meeting of the Security Council of 20 July 2011, p. 2. 
N. Krisch, Article 39, in: B. Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations; A Commentary, 
Volume II, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), paras. 4-6, 12-39. 
See, for example, the statement made by the People's Republic of China. China recognised that 
climate change poses a common challenge for all countries which affects human survival and 
development. Further, China stated: 'Climate change may affect security, but it is fundamentally a 
sustainable development issue. The Security Council lacks expertise in climate change and the 
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Indeed, the Security Council usually deals with current conflicts or more imminent 
threats to international peace and security, 24 and generally becomes involved when a 
concrete dispute between states or within a state materialises. Furthermore, it may be 
difficult to envisage what measures the Security Council should take in order to 
implement its responsibility to maintain international peace and security in relation 
to such a general and distant threat. As the President of the Security Council 
recognised in his statement, the Economic and Social Council and the General 
Assembly are primarily responsible within the United Nations for discussing climate 
change and the measures necessary for preventing or mitigating its consequences. The 
Security Council should only become involved when specific threats to international 
peace and security materialise. 
C. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PROTECTION OF 
THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
If an armed conflict materialises, irrespective of its causes and the reasons for using 
force25, human security is primarily safeguarded by the law of armed conflict or jus in 
bello. Indeed, the outbreak of an armed conflict will trigger the application of this 
special regime of public international law. The law of armed conflict has gradually 
been codified since the mid-19th century and imposes limitations on the rights of 
states to use military force. As such, it aims to alleviate 'as much as possible the 
calamities of war', as befits civilised nations. 26 
The law of armed conflict is generally based on four fundamental principles, 
namely the principle of military necessity, the principle of distinction, the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of humanity. The principle of military necessity 
entitles states to use military force against other states so as to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy, which qualifies as the only legitimate object of states during 
24 
25 
26 
72 
necessary means and resources. Moreover, the Council is not a forum for decision-making with 
universal representation. Its discussions are not aimed at putting together a broadly accepted 
programme, nor can they take the place of the UNFCCC negotiations among the 193 United Nations 
Member States.' According to Russia, the involvement of the Security Council would have no added 
value, but 'would merely lead to a further politicization of the issue and increased disagreements 
among countries'. S/PV.6587, Meeting of the Security Council of 20 July 2011, pp. 9, 13. 
See, for example, the statement made by Germany in 2007 on behalf of the European Union and the 
statement of the Netherlands. S/PV.5663, Meeting of the Security Council of 17 April2007, pp. 19, 21. 
For a discussion of the jus ad bellum and the use of force by states in relation to climate change, 
including a brief discussion of the relationship between the responsibility to protect, human 
security and climate change, see Gray, supra note 9, pp. 236-240. 
St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 
Grammes Weight, signed on 11 December 1868, entered into force on 11 December 1868, AJIL, Vol. 
1, No. 2, Supplement: Official Documents, 1907, p. 95, preambular paras 1-2. 
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armed conflict.27 As such, states must distinguish between military objects and 
combatants on the one hand and civilian objects and civilians on the other (the 
principle of distinction) and avoid excessive collateral damage to civilian objects and 
civilians (the principle of proportionality). Finally, the entitlement to use military 
force within these boundaries is limited by the principle of humanity, which provides 
for an absolute limitation to any use of military force. 28 
The inherent limitation to the entitlement to use military force by the principles of 
military necessity, distinction and proportionality, and the absolute limitation 
provided by the principle of humanity, indicate that the law of armed conflict is 
primarily focused on the protection of the victims of armed conflict, including 
civilians. It is for that reason that this area of public international law is also generally 
known as international humanitarian law (IHL).29 
The rules of IHL were generally developed in customary international law in the 
course of the 19th and 20th centuries and have been codified in a number of general 
conventions since 1864. The most comprehensive of these general conventions is 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which was concluded in 1977 after 
four years of negotiation in order to reaffirm and develop IHL. 30 In 2005 the 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Ibid., p. 95, preambular para. 3. This object and purpose is repeated in Article 3 of the 1880 Oxford 
Manual on the Law of War on Land, adopted by the Institut de Droit International (which was 
established in 1873). Through <www.icrc.org>. Compare also the descriptions of military necessity 
in the 1863 Lieber Code, in which military necessity was understood as consisting of measures 
'which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war' (Article 14), admitting 'all direct 
destruction oflife or limb or armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally 
unavoidable in the armed contests of the war' (Article 15). Through <www.icrc.org>. 
St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 26, preambular paras 1, 5-6. This author has argued that the 
entitlement to use military force within these boundaries is further limited by the laws protecting 
the natural environment, as reflected in the principle of ambituity (after the Latin word 'ambitus', 
which means environment). See E.V. Koppe, The Principle of Ambituity and the Prohibition against 
Excessive Collateral Damage to the Environment during Armed Conflict, 82 Nordic Journal of 
International Law (2013). 
More precisely, IHL refers to that branch of the law of armed conflict which is known as 'Geneva 
law'. The law of Geneva (named after the place where the majority of these rules were codified, 
starting in 1864) intends to protect 'the victims of war and [aims] to provide safeguards for disabled 
armed forces personnel and persons not taking part in the hostilities'. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, 
para. 75. Geneva law must be distinguished from the law of The Hague, which with 'the rights and 
duties of belligerents in their conduct of operations [limits] the choice of methods and means of 
injuring the enemy in an international armed conflict'. Since 1968 the law of The Hague and the law 
of Geneva have been complemented by a third branch of the law of armed conflict, namely the law 
of New York. The law of New York was instigated by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and focuses on the protection of human rights during armed conflict. F. Kalshoven and Zegveld, 
Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law, 4th 
edition, ICRC 8, 22 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), opened for signature on 
12 December 1977, entered into force on 7 December 1978, UNTS, Vol. 1125, No. 17512. Additional 
Protocol I converges the law of the Hague with the law of Geneva. Additional Protocol II regulates 
the law applicable in non-international armed conflict. 
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published the results of its 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (CIHL Study). 31 The ICRC 
identified 161 rules of customary international law in relation to both international 
and non-international armed conflict. 32 Although the CIHL Study has been 
criticised in the literature, 33 it has 'achieved remarkable success in the short time 
following its publication'34 and appears to be a valuable starting point for a general 
discussion on the substance and scope of certain norms of international 
humanitarian law. 
In view of the above-mentioned consequences of climate change, a number of rules 
of international humanitarian law will become particularly relevant when it comes to 
the protection of the victims of armed conflict, in particular the rules relating to food 
security, displaced persons and humanitarian relief.35 First, customary international 
humanitarian law prohibits the use of starvation of the civilian population as a method 
of warfare (Rule 53) and, as a matter of principle, the destruction of objects 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
74 
J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law; Volume 
I: Rules, International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Some conflicts are difficult to characterise, though, because of a foreign intervention in a non-
international armed conflict or because a non-international armed conflict takes place on the 
territory of several states. See S. Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian 
Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 (873) International Review of the Red Cross 83-93 
(2009). The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq and the conflict between 
Israel and Lebanon and Hezbollah may qualify as mixed armed conflicts with elements of both 
international and non-international armed conflict. Although a modern 'law of armed conflict' may 
be emerging in response to such developments, which would apply to all types of armed conflict, the 
dichotomy between international and non-international armed conflict cannot be ignored, in 
particular when it comes to the law relating to occupation, to prisoners of war and to means and 
methods of warfare. R. Kolb and R. Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed 
Conflicts 67-70 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008). See, for the problems following 'requalification' of 
a conflict, in particular with respect to the treatment of combatants and non-combatants, S. Wills, 
The Legal Characterization of the Armed Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq: Implications for 
Protection, 58 Netherlands International Law Review 173-208 (2011). 
See E. Wilmshurst and S. Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also G.H. Aldrich, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law - An Interpretation on Behalf of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 76 British Yearbook of International Law (2005); M. Bothe, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: Some Reflections on the ICRC Study, Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (2005). For an official government response, see J.B. Bellinger, Ill and W.J. 
Haynes, II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 (866) International Review of the Red Cross (2007). 
E. Wilmshurst, Conclusions, in: Wilmshurst and Breau, supra note 33, p. 409. 
The consequences of climate change will also increase the unpredictability of conflict for the 
belligerent parties. As such this will impact the application of the IHL, including rules on targeting, 
protection of civilians and the environment, and even rules relating to weather manipulation. 
Hulme, supra note 8, pp. 193-214. In particular, the rules relating to the protection of the 
environment during armed conflict may be significant in view of the increased risk of hostilities in 
ecologically sensitive regions, such as the Arctic or Antarctica due to the melting of the ice sheets. 
Warfare in those regions might have disastrous consequences for the fragile ecosystem of the arctic. 
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indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural 
areas, crops, drinking water installations and irrigation infrastructure (Rule 54).36 
Both rules are intended to alleviate the consequences of war for the civilian population 
and apply during both international and non-international armed conflict.37 Rule 54, 
as well as the rules relating to humanitarian relief (Rules 55 and 56), are corollaries of 
the prohibition on using starvation as a method of warfare, which means that a 
violation of these Rules may ipso facto entail a breach of Rule 53.38 
Second, customary international humanitarian law requires the parties to a 
conflict - whether it is international or non-international - to allow and facilitate 
humanitarian relief for civilians in need (Rule 55). The parties to a conflict must also 
ensure, subject to temporary restrictions due to military necessity, the freedom of 
movement of humanitarian relief personnel (Rule 56). Both rules apply during 
international and non-international armed conflict39 and are related to the rules 
governing humanitarian assistance to victims of disasters, which will be discussed 
below. Although the consent of the parties to the conflict is required in order to 
provide humanitarian assistance (often by the ICRC), such 'consent must not be 
refused on arbitrary grounds' and must be accepted when 'a civilian population is 
threatened with starvation and a humanitarian organization which provides relief on 
an impartial and non-discriminatory basis is able to remedy the situation'.40 According 
to Barber, there is even sufficient evidence to conclude that such obligation to consent 
to humanitarian assistance must be accepted by states irrespective of the circumstances 
and is not limited to cases where the population is threatened with starvation.41 
Third, in relation to displaced persons the ICRC established that customary 
international humanitarian law entails a number of rights and obligations in relation 
to displaced persons, including the obligation that '[i]n case of displacement, all 
possible measures must be taken in order that the civilians concerned are received 
under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and that 
members of the same family are not separated ' (Rule 131). Rule 131 applies in both 
international and non-international armed conflict42 and is additional to the general 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
See Articles 54(2) Additional Protocol I and Article 14 Additional Protocol II. 
Rules 53 and 54 are reflected in Article 54(1) and 54 (2) Additional Protocol I and Article 14 
Additional Protocol II. 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 31, p. 188. 
Rules 55 and 56 are partially reflected in Article 70 Additional Protocol I and Article 18 Additional 
Protocol II. 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 31, p. 197. See also ICRC, International Humanitarian 
Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, Report submitted to the 31st International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (31IC/11/5.1.2), p. 25. 
R. Barber, Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights 
law, 91 International Review of the Red Cross 391 (2009). 
Rule 131 is reflected in Articles 17 and 4(3)(b) Additional Protocol II and Article 49(3) Fourth 
Geneva Convention (in case of occupation). 
8 HR&ILD 1 (2014) 75 
Erik V. Koppe 
protection provided to civilians under customary international humanitarian law. 
The primary responsibility to provide help to displaced persons lies with the state 
where the displacement occurs. If that state has no control over that territory, it must 
allow humanitarian relief workers to pass and provide the help needed in accordance 
with the above-mentioned Rules 55 and 56.43 
These rules must therefore be taken into consideration by all states and organised 
armed groups in case of international or non-international armed conflict. As was 
mentioned above, these rules may become particularly relevant where armed conflict 
is exacerbated by the consequences of climate change. 
D. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PROTECTION OF 
THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
It is nowadays generally accepted that human rights will remain applicable during 
armed conflict.44 Indeed, in 1996 the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) observed in 
its Nuclear Weapons Opinion that 'the protection of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of 
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time 
of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In 
principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in 
hostilities.'45 In 2004, the ICJ observed more generally that 'the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the 
effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights'.46 
Although the ICJ appears to confirm the applicability of human rights during 
armed conflict as a matter of course, the outbreak of armed conflict used to have 
significant consequences for the application of rules of public international law in the 
relationship between belligerent states. In the past, the legal relationship between 
43 
44 
45 
46 
76 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 31, p. 467. Practical guidance for states and international 
organisations (both government and non-governmental) is provided by the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, which were first presented to the Human Rights Commission in 1998 (El 
CN.4/1998/53/Add.2). 
See for an analysis of the concurrent application of human rights law and IHL from a victim's 
perspective: J.-M. Henckaerts, Concurrent Application of International Human Rights Law: 
Victims in Search of a Forum, 1 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 95 (2007). 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
para. 25. 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 106. 
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belligerents would be affected by the outbreak of hostilities, including the termination 
of all applicable treaties between belligerent states.47 
Nowadays it appears to be generally accepted that armed conflict does not 
automatically terminate or suspend treaties, and that suspension or termination 
depends on the classic but difficult to determine criteria of the intention of the parties 
as reflected in the text of the treaty, or the object and purpose of the treaty in question.48 
This pragmatic view is reflected in the 2011 Draft Articles of the International Law 
Commission.49 Article 3 of the Draft Articles provides: 'The existence of an armed 
conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties: (a) as 
between States parties to the conflict; (b) as between a State party to the conflict and a 
State that is not.' Although the subject matter of a treaty is a factor which may indicate 
that a treaty is susceptible to termination (Article 6), the Draft Articles provide an 
'indicative list of treaties the subject-matter of which involves an implication that they 
continue in operation, in whole or in part, during armed conflict' (Article 7 and 
Annex). This indicative list refers to twelve categories of treaty, including '[t]reaties for 
the international protection of human rights'. 5° 
It follows therefore that, as a matter of principle, the legal relationship between 
belligerent states and non-belligerent states remains unaffected. 51 As such, belligerent 
states, whether they are involved in an international or a non-international armed 
conflict, must continue to observe their international obligations under human rights 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
J. Delbriick, War, Effects on Treaties, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law; Volume Four; Quirin, Ex Parte to Zones of Peace 1369 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000). Also 
McNair, who provides a number of historical examples of the application of this theory. A.D. 
McNair, The Law of Treaties 698-702 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); A/CN.4/550, The effect of 
armed conflict on treaties: an examination of practice and doctrine; Memorandum by the 
Secretariat, 1 February 2005; International Law Commission, fifty-seventh session, Geneva, 2 May-
3 June 2005 and 4 July- 5 August 2005, pp. 12-13. Brownlie states: 'War is the polar opposite of 
peace and involves a complete rupture of relations, and a return to anarchy. It follows that all treaties 
are annulled without exception. The right of abrogation arises from the occurrence of war regardless 
of the original intention of the parties.' A/CN.4/552, First Report on the Effects of Armed Conflicts 
on Treaties, by Mr Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, of 21 April 2005; International Law 
Commission, fifty-seventh session, Geneva, 2 May- 3 June and 4 July- 5 August 2005, p. 4. 
A/CN.4/550, The effect of armed conflict on treaties: an examination of practice and doctrine; 
Memorandum by the Secretariat, pp. 1, 9-12, 13-14. 
A/66/10, para. 100; Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties 2011. The Draft Articles 
were taken note of by the General Assembly in 2011 (A/RES/66/99 of 9 December 2011, para. 3). 
Special Rapporteur Brownlie found that the identification of categories of treaties not susceptible of 
termination during armed conflict was so common in the literature that he followed suit. The 
categories listed in the annex are largely based on the examples given in literature and are included 
for the sake of discussion by the Commission. A/CN.4/552, First Report on the Effects of Armed 
Conflicts on Treaties, by Mr Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, Comment to Draft article 7, pp. 20-21. 
See also McNair, supra note 47, p. 728. McNair writes that only under exceptional circumstances 
may an implied condition be found to exist ( ... ) which excludes or modifies the operation of such a 
treaty during the war. See also A/CN.4/552, First Report on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on 
Treaties, by Mr Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, of 21 April2005; International Law Commission, 
fifty-seventh session, Geneva, 2 May- 3 June and 4 July- 5 August 2005, Draft article 3, p. 10. 
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law treaties towards their contracting parties and may only derogate from their 
obligations if the treaty specifically so provides. 
It further follows that the relationship between two or more belligerent states also 
remains unaffected and that human rights law and IHL will be simultaneously 
applicable in the relationship between belligerents inter se. The ICJ recognised in the 
Wall Opinion that there may be circumstances which are exclusively regulated by IHL 
or human rights law, but that there may also be circumstances that will be regulated 
by both IHL and human rights law. In that case, both branches must be taken into 
consideration, namely 'human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law'. 52 Indeed, both branches of public international law are triggered 
by different criteria and have a different scope of application. It will therefore depend 
on the facts and circumstances of each case whether and to what extent a belligerent 
state must observe its human rights obligations towards another belligerent state. 
So, what would be the consequences of the continuing applicability of human rights 
law during armed conflict in light of the consequences of climate change? The 
relationship between climate change and international human rights law has been 
discussed in detail elsewhere in this issue. It appears that the consequences of climate 
change will impact primarily on international economic, social and cultural rights, 53 in 
particular in states which will be most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change 
(small island states, low-lying states, delta regions, and states with vulnerable agricultural 
systems). These rights have been primarily laid down in the 1966 International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 54 which includes 'the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing' (Article 11(1)), the right 'to be free from hunger' 
(Article 11(2)), and the right to health (Article 12). The ICESCR currently has 161 States 
Parties and thus appears to qualify as a good starting point for further analysis. 
While civil political rights are generally obligations of result and sometimes even 
non-derogable, the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights generally 
requires that a state performs to the best of its abilities. Indeed, Article 11 requires 
States Parties to take 'appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right'. It is not 
unlikely that belligerent states will be held to a different standard in determining a 
state's efforts to implement these rights than states which are not involved in armed 
conflict. There may even be circumstances in which the wrongfulness of an omission 
by a state involved in an armed conflict to implement these rights may be precluded 
due to force majeure (Article 23 Draft Articles on State Responsibility). A plea of force 
majeure would require as a minimum that the conflict was unforeseen, that the 
52 
53 
54 
78 
Wall Opinion, para. 106. 
S. Humphreys, Climate Change and International Human Rights Law, in: R. Rayfuse and S.V. Scott, 
International Law, supra note 7, p. 35. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature on 
19 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, UNTS, Vol. 993, No. 14531. 
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conflict made it materially impossible (and not just burdensome) to perform 
obligations under the ICESCR, and that the state invoking it did not cause or at least 
contribute to the emergency situation. 
Furthermore, the obligation of a belligerent state must be considered in light of its 
obligations under IHL as lex specialis. This means that the obligation to take 
appropriate measures to provide adequate food, housing and health and the obligation 
to take measures 'individually and through international cooperation' to ensure food 
security, housing and health must be interpreted in light of the above-mentioned 
customary rules of international humanitarian law, as established by the ICRC, which 
apply during both international and non-international conflict. These rules thus 
appear to reinforce rather than conflict with the existing human rights obligations of 
belligerent states. Indeed, the obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure food 
security and shelter must be interpreted in light of the prohibition of starvation as a 
weapon of warfare, the prohibition from destroying objects indispensable to the 
survival of the population and the obligation to protect displaced persons. As such, 
the simultaneous application of these rules in the relationship between belligerents 
leads to convergence of IHL obligations and human rights obligations. 
What then about the obligations of non-belligerent states to take appropriate 
measures to ensure the protection of the economic, social and cultural rights of those 
who suffer not only from the consequences of climate change (drought, natural 
disasters, rising sea level) but also armed conflict? After all, the consequences of 
climate change concern the entire of community of states and create particular 
responsibilities for industrialised states, i.e. those states which have contributed the 
most to the emission of greenhouse gases. 
The scope of the obligations of non-belligerents depends first and foremost on the 
question to what extent states have an obligation to implement economic, social and 
cultural rights outside their own territories and subsequently to what extent states may 
implement these duties within the framework of an armed conflict to which they are 
not party. While the application of a civil and political rights treaty, such as the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is limited to individuals 
within the territories of the States Parties and subject to their jurisdiction, no such 
clause relating to the scope of application was included in the ICESCR. According to 
the International Court of Justice, the absence of a provision which regulates the 
convention's scope of application may be 'explicable by the fact that [the] Covenant 
guarantees rights which are essentially territorial', but does not exclude that the ICESCR 
also applies to territories under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of States Parties. 55 
The obligations of States Parties under the ICESCR therefore appear, as a matter of 
principle, to be limited to individuals within their territories and possibly within their 
55 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion of9 July 2004 (Wall Opinion), para. 112. See also M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in International Law 42-46 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
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jurisdiction. However, the ICESCR also obliges States Parties to the Convention to 
cooperate with each other in order to realise the fulfilment of the rights laid down in 
the convention. Article 2(1) ICESCR provides: 'Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures.' States must therefore cooperate to realise their 
obligations under the ICESCR, as was duly noted by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment 3. The Committee noted that 
States Parties to the ICESCR must use the resources available in the international 
community and that all States have an obligation to cooperate in order to realise the 
rights enshrined in the Covenant. 56 
In 2011 a group of experts convened in Maastricht and drafted the Maastricht 
Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles)_57 According to the drafters, the 
Maastricht Principles 'constitute an international expert opinion, restating human 
rights law', and 'clarify extraterritorial obligations of States on the basis of standing 
international law'. 58 Pursuant to Principles 33 and 35 of the Maastricht Principles, all 
states have an obligation to provide international assistance, as part of their obligation 
to cooperate, to contribute to the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights in 
other states and to respond to requests to assist or cooperate. 
The obligation to cooperate and provide such assistance may be particularly 
relevant in respect of food security problems, the displacement of people and the 
outbreak of disease resulting from disasters, irrespective of the origin of the disaster 
(nature, man or armed conflict). This obligation appears to be related to the rules 
concerning humanitarian assistance which have been developed in doctrine59 and 
56 
57 
58 
59 
80 
General Comment No. 3 (1990); The Nature of States' Parties obligations (art. 2 para. 1 of the 
Covenant), paras 13-14, in: E/1991/23, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; Report 
on the Fifth Session, 26 November- 14 December 1990, Annex Ill. 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, adopted on 28 September 2011, through <www.etoconsortium.org>. For a 
commentary on the principles, see 0. De Schutter, A. Eide et al., Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 34 Human Rights Quarterly (2012). 
Maastricht, Booklet by ET Os for human rights beyond Borders, p. 3, through <www.etoconsortium. 
org>. 
See Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance of the (expert) Council of the San 
Remo Institute (Guiding Principles), 33 International Review of the Red Cross 519 (1993); Institut de 
Droit International, Resolution of 2 September 2003 on Humanitarian Assistance, Bruges Session 
- 2003 (Bruges Resolution). The importance of humanitarian assistance had already been recognised 
by the General Assembly in 1988 (A/RES/43/131 of 8 December 1988) and 1991 (A/RES/46/182 of 
19 December 1991). Preambular para. 8 of A/RES/43/131, which provides: 'Considering that the 
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which have been on the agenda of the International Law Commission (ILC) since 
2007.60 These rules, which arguably reflect a progressive development of international 
law, 61 allegedly include a qualified right of individuals to humanitarian assistance62 
and an alleged duty of states to cooperate with states affected by disasters in organising 
and distributing humanitarian assistance.63 
However, any humanitarian assistance provided to the victims of disaster is 
subject to the consent of the state involved. 64 Indeed, an affected state has the primary 
responsibility to ensure the protection of persons in its territory65 by virtue of its 
sovereignty, 66 but it may not reject a (bona fide) offer for humanitarian assistance.67 
Such obligation arguably follows from the responsibility of states to protect their 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
abandonment of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations without 
humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human dignity'. 
The Drafting Committee of the ILC is currently in the process of drafting articles relating to the issue 
of 'Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters'. See the reports of the Drafting Committee of the 
ILC with the provisionally adopted Articles 1-5 (A/CN.4/L.758 (2009), 6-9 (A/CN.4/L.776 (2010), 
10-11 (A/CN.4/L.794 (2011), 5bis, 12-15 (A/CN.4/L.812 (2012), and 5ter, 16 (A/CN.4/L.815 (2013). 
According to Special Rapporteur Valencia-Ospina, the topic is in principle subject to the progressive 
development of international law. A/CN.4/598, Preliminary report on the protection of persons in 
the event of disasters, by Mr Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, 5 May 2008, para. 42. 
B. Vukas, Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (www.mpepil.com), para. 18. See also Guiding Principle 1 and implicitly Section I, 
II and V Bruges Resolution. According to Spieker, however, there is no general and comprehensive 
treaty law relating to humanitarian assistance in non-conflict situations and 'customary law has not 
developed in order to fill-in this lacuna'. H. Spieker, The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian 
Assistance, in: H.-J. Heintze and A. Zwitter (eds.), International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: 
A Crosscut Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism 28-29 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011). 
See Section V IDI Bruges Resolution and provisional ILC Article 5 on Protection Persons in the Event 
of Disaster. An offer to provide humanitarian assistance shall not be considered an unfriendly act or 
unlawful interference in the internal affairs of the affected states. See Guiding Principle 5, Section IV 
IDI Bruges Resolution, and provisional ILC Article 12 on Protection Persons in the Event of Disaster. 
See Guiding Principles 5 and 6, Section IV(2) and V(3) IDI Bruges Resolution, and provisional ILC 
Article 13 on Protection Persons in the Event of Disaster. 
See Guiding Principles 4 and 6, Section Ill IDI Bruges Resolution, and provisional ILC Article 9 on 
Protection Persons in the Event of Disaster. See also A/RES/43/131, para. 2 and A/RES/46/182, 
Guiding Principle 4. For the modalities of such cooperation, see the Guidelines for the Domestic 
Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (the 
IDRL Guidelines), which were adopted in 2007 at the 301h International Conference of the States 
Parties to the Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
through <www.ifrc.org>. 
This was specifically recognized in Provisional ILC Article 9 on the Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disaster. The reference to the sovereignty of the affected state was included to underline the fact that 
sovereignty does not only establish rights but also implies obligations. The Committee wished 'to 
avoid any perceived connection with the concept of"responsibilityto protect"', however. Statement of 
the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of20 July 2010, pp. 10-11, related to A/CN.4/L.776 of 14 July 
2010, Protection of persons in the event of disasters; Texts and titles of Draft Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 
provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on 6, 7 and 8 July 2010. Through <legal.un.org/ik>. 
Barber, supra note 41, p. 397. 
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citizens and the obligations of states which derive from customary international 
humanitarian law (as were discussed above) and human rights law, in particular the 
obligations under the ICESCR.68 An offer for humanitarian assistance may in any 
case not be refused when it is likely that such refusal may endanger the fundamental 
human rights of the victims or would amount to a violation of the ban on starvation 
of civilians as a method of warfare. 69 
If an affected state refuses to accept offers for assistance, the states offering 
assistance may call upon the competent United Nations organs, including the Security 
Council, among others, to take the necessary measures to persuade or even coerce an 
affected state to accept humanitarian assistance?0 Although some argue that states 
offering assistance and international organisations 'should be permitted to resort to 
various measures to induce the affected State to discontinue unjust refusal of 
humanitarian assistance',71 such measures would, although perhaps to some extent 
legitimate, be contrary to the existing rules of public international law if they involved 
the use of force without the authorisation of the Security Council. 
On the basis of the foregoing it appears that the relationship between belligerents 
and non-belligerents will continue to be governed by their respective obligations 
under human rights law, which may include obligations under the ICESCR. This 
means that as a matter of principle belligerents must observe their obligations under 
the Covenant and take measures to provide food and water security, housing and 
shelter and health care to the people within their territory or jurisdiction as appropriate 
under the circumstances. Further, non-belligerents arguably have an obligation to 
cooperate with belligerent states in order to assist in the implementation of the latter 
states' obligations. Both obligations are complemented by the alleged duties to 
cooperate relating to humanitarian assistance in disaster situations, which include 
disasters caused by armed conflict. 
As such, these obligations under human rights law and the alleged obligations 
relating to humanitarian assistance appear to converge with the obligations of 
belligerent states under IHL relating to humanitarian relief. The convergence of the 
obligations of the various actors involved with respect to humanitarian assistance 
should help them, in particular humanitarian agencies, in their implementation of 
their humanitarian work, to the benefit of the victims involved. 
68 
69 
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82 
Ibid., pp. 391-397. 
Section VIII(l) IDI Bruges Resolution. See also in relation to the obligation to accept humanitarian 
assistance in such situations during armed conflict (as mentioned above): Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck, supra note 31, p. 197. 
Guiding Principles 7 and 8 and Section VIII(2) and (3) IDI Bruges Resolution. 
Vukas, supra note 62, para. 25. 
Intersentia 
Climate Change and Human Security during Armed Conflict 
E. CONCLUSION 
Working Group I of the IPCC recently concluded that there is a clear human influence 
on the climate system and that climate change has resulted, among other things, in 
the melting of the Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets and a rising sea level and will cause 
changes in the global weather cycle. These events pose threats not only to human 
security but also to international peace and security. According to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations climate change is a threat multiplier, which may 
exacerbate existing sources of conflict and insecurity. 
Although the threats of the consequences of climate change were duly recognised 
by the states which participated in the Security Council debates in 2007 and 2011, the 
Council itself was not willing to assume any direct responsibilities. Instead, it 
recognised the responsibility of other organs and entities, including the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, with respect to sustainable 
development issues, including climate change. 
While the consequences of climate change will likely impact on human security, 
that impact will be even more significant if those consequences contribute to the 
outbreak of armed conflict. It is therefore pertinent that all actors involved are aware 
of the relevant rules which are intended to protect the victims of armed conflict under 
IHL, as well as the relevant rules of international human rights law, which remain 
applicable in times of armed conflict. In particular, all actors involved should take full 
note of the customary rules of IHL and human rights law which are intended to 
provide food security, humanitarian relief and help to displaced persons, and 
acknowledge the convergence between the various norms, especially when it comes to 
providing humanitarian relief or assistance. 
These rules not only attribute rights to victims of disasters, including armed 
conflict, and to humanitarian agencies, but also entail obligations for belligerent and 
non-belligerent states. In view of the consequences of climate change, it is advisable 
that states and humanitarian agencies cooperate in making contingency plans in 
relation to these obligations and implement them in domestic legislation, military 
manuals and humanitarian guidelines.72 Indeed, if armed conflict will be a result of 
climate change exacerbating existing sources of conflict and insecurity, the 
environment in which states and humanitarian agencies will have to operate when 
that happens will likely be chaotic. Proper contingency planning will ensure that 
everyone is on the same page in an attempt to help those who need it the most. Such 
recognition and planning may contribute to maintaining and if necessary restoring a 
sustainable society and long-term peace, as envisaged by the 2013 Utrecht Principles. 
72 Hulme, supra note 8, pp. 217-218. 
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